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Selected Mechanics' Lien Priority
Problems
By John J. Hopkins*
THE LAW of mechanics' liens is confusing. Even counsel for con-
struction lenders, builders, materialmen, title insurers, and others who
are confronted daily with problems in this area frequently battle the
uncertainties and ambiguities in the law. Attention here will be
focused upon selected priority of lien problems which have particularly
troubled attorneys. While some answers will be suggested, the purpose
of the article is to pinpoint these problems in the hope that the Gover-
nor's Advisory Committee on Mechanics' Liens and various other
groups now studying the lien law may find satisfactory answers. Their
task will not be an easy one, for with problems of priority there will
inevitably be sharp divisions of opinion.
Lien Problems Related to Commencement of Work
What is Commencement of Work?
Mechanics' liens attach at the commencement of the improvement
for which the lien claimant has done his work or furnished his material
-not when the claim of lien is recorded, and not when the claimant
actually performed his work or delivered 'his material.' It is therefore
important for priority purposes to ascertain what constitutes com-
mencement of work. The generally recognized test is: "some work
and labor on the ground, the effects of which are apparent-easily seen
by everybody; such as beginning to dig the foundation, or work of like
description, which everyone can readily see and recognize as the
commencement of a building."2
This "visible to the eye" test, however, is not satisfactory where the
operations in question are preparatory to actual construction, such as
clearing or leveling the building site, installing a water meter, marking
the improvement location with stakes, or removing or demolishing
buildings. Besides, it is common for materials to be used on a project
to be delivered to adjoining property. Title insurance companies have
0 A.B. 1950, Loyola University; LL.B. 1953, Stanford; member, California Bar;
General Counsel for Transamerica Title Insurance Co.
1 CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 1188.1.
2 Arthur B. Sid, Inc. v. Bridges, 189 Cal. App. 2d 599, 602, 11 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324
(1961) (quoting PimLwps, MECniAmcs' LmNs 387 (3d ed. 1893)).
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even used mine detectors to be certain that no material was lurking in
the construction site weeds. But at least there was some standard, and
by careful inspection a degree of protection could be afforded insurers
and lenders. A possible big break came early in 1961 in Nolte v. Smith8
where it was held that survey work of a type not previously considered
sufficient to constitute the commencement of work was sufficient.
Although not a priority case, Nolte may indicate a departure from the
traditional test, since the visibility of certain pipe markers placed by
the claimant was not even considered as a factor in the result. The
court cites with apparent favor a Minnesota decision upholding the
lien of an architect in a case where no physical change had been
affected upon the land subjected to the lien.4
In proper cases, architects are given a lien for "performing labor
upon or bestowing skill or other necessary services on... the construc-
tion, alteration, addition to, or repair, either in whole or in part, of,
any building, structure, or other work of improvement .... ."5 Is the
start of such architectural services commencement of work for deter-
mining the priority of the liens for work performed and materials used
later in completing the project? In Design Associates Inc. v. Welch'
the court refused to allow a lien for architectural services of a "pre-
preliminary" nature, whereas in Nolte the planned project was never
commenced. However, the court does cite as "apt" the language of
Fiske v. School Dist. :7 "'Perhaps, if the building be actually con-
structed, the drawing of plans then enters into the construction...., ,
Also, in upholding the trial court's determination that the architectural
work involved did not create a lien, the court does state that "it is a
question of fact whether improvement has been commenced."9 Does
the court mean that certain architectural services might constitute
commencement of work for lien priority purposes, especially where
there is no visible evidence on the property and the project planned
was actually constructed? At least two cases awaiting trial in San
Mateo and Santa Clara Counties are priority cases (unlike Design
Associates) and present the question whether laborers and material-
s 189 Cal. App. 2d 140, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1961).
4 Lamoreaux v. Anderschi, 128 Minn. 261, 150 N.W. 908 (1915).
5 CA.L. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1181.
6 224 A.C.A. 209, 36 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1964).
7 58 Neb. 163,38 N.W. 392 (1899).
8 224 A.C.A. at 217, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
9Id. at 217, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (quoting Arthur B. Siti, Inc. v. Bridges, 189 Cal.
App. 2d 599, 601, 11 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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men can "ride the coattails" of the project architect for purposes of
priority.'0
It seems probable that the great favor shown lien claimants by the
courts of this State will lead inevitably to more decisions broadening
the concept of commencement of work for lien purposes. It is unreason-
able for hidden work to afford later mechanics priority over the lender
who records his deed of trust or mortgage before the start of any
apparent work upon the property but after unseen work has com-
menced. A possible solution would be a statute providing that the liens
of architects, engineers, and any others doing non-visible work would
be subordinate to any mortgage or deed of trust recorded without
actual notice of the work, unless a special notice of commencement
was recorded. It is doubtful that non-visible work should ever consti-
tute commencement as to all subsequent work on the property, even
if the special notice is given. If the commencement notice for sur-
veyors', architects', or engineers' work was held commencement of
work on the improvement itself, financing would be difficult or
impossible to obtain after completion of the preliminary work. True,
the subsequent liens could be bonded pursuant to section 1188.2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, but the expense and practical unavail-
ability of such bonds makes them a doubtful answer to the problem.'1
Subdivisions and Problems of Commencement
Under section 1195.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the start of
the first house in a subdivision the commencement of all the subse-
quent houses for priority of lien purposes? The section provides that
each residential unit shall be considered a separate work of improve-
ment and that the time for filing claims of lien against each unit shall
run from the time of completion of that unit. Section 1195.1 deals only
with the filing of claims of lien, with no specific provision as to
commencement for lien purposes. Ogden suggests that "the definition
was intended to make each residential structure a separate work of
improvement solely for completion purposes."12 This interpretation is
strengthened by the refusal of the legislature to insert suggested
language which dealt specifically with commencement.' 3 There are no
cases on the problem because lenders and title insurers guarantee
10 For ethical reasons these cases cannot be cited by name at present.
"1 But see A-1 Door Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 670, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 85 (1964), which indicates that a bond is a practical way to avoid problems of
stop notice claims.
12 OGDENr CALIFORNu REA. PAoPERTY 624 (1954).
Is 2 CAl.. ASSEMBLY JouR. 2710 (reg. sess. 1954).
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priority by recording encumbrances before the work on the first house
begins. Where "model homes" have been built, title insurers require
a bond to be filed or wait until the period for filing claims has run
before insuring the priority of a loan given to finance the construction
of the balance of the tract.
Where the off-site work14 on a subdivision is done pursuant to a
separate contract, section 1189.1(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the commencement of such work, although it ordinarily
precedes the start of the first house, does not constitute commence-
ment of the construction phase of the project. However, if such off-site
work is not done pursuant to a separate contract, its start would appear
to be a general commencement of work done on the site or builder's
land for priority of lien purposes under section 1188.1."5
A related problem concerns the subdivision project under one
general contract which is completed in several units. Assuming that
section 1195.1 makes the start of the first house commencement, for
lien purposes, of each succeeding house, it is probable that the com-
mencement of the first house in the first of several units would be
regarded as commencement of each succeeding house in any unit of
the same subdivision. This is especially true if there is a single general
contract for all of the units. The problem is more difficult where the
financing of the various units is by different lenders-a common occur-
rence. Must the lender of unit B wait ninety days after the last notice
of completion has been filed for unit A before he may safely record his
encumbrance? He would be well advised to wait. Commencement of
the houses in unit A may well have inured to the benefit of unit B
mechanics insofar as the determination of their priority versus the
loan under section 1188.1. But even waiting ninety days may not be
adequate protection, since the notice of completion respecting that
unit may not have been proper.
All of this comes to a head when the subdivider wishes to com-
mence unit B as rapidly as possible after A. The prudent lender who
finances the second unit will require suitable title insurance before
recording his mortgage or deed of trust. The title company, as a condi-
tion precedent to the issuance of its policy, will insist that the requisite
period elapse after recordation of proper completion notice of unit A,
or that a bond under section 1188.2 be supplied. The delay may en-
danger the success of the project, especially since construction crews
will not be able to move on to the second unit.
14 See CAL.. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 1184.1 (refers to a lien for civic improvements made
at the request of the site owner).
1 See OGDENr, CAaromq&A R L PRoPERTY 624 (1954).
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Commencement and the Problem of On-Site Work Done by the Off-
Site Contractor
Suppose that a contractor is engaged under separate contract to do
off-site work of the type mentioned in Code of Civil Procedure section
1184.1 upon a subdivision project. Suppose further that the subdivider
is aware of the presence of earth moving equipment needed for the
off-site work and persuades the contractor to do certain on-site jobs,
such as blading out driveways for prospective building sites, leveling
and rolling a pad for the tract office and lumber stockpile, digging
holes for the slab foundations, or digging away earthen banks to
create patio space for some of the building sites. The possibilities are
endless.
These minor on-site jobs should be done while all the appropriate
equipment of the off-site contractor is on the scene. However, a prob-
lem may arise later in determining the priorities of the construction
money lender, whose deed of trust was recorded prior to the com-
mencement of the work under a separate building construction con-
tract, and an unpaid mechanic, whose lien arose out of work done
during the house construction. The unpaid mechanic argues that the
date the house construction commences, for priority of lien purposes,
is the date the off-site improvement begins, or at least the date when
the off-site contractor commenced the "extras" previously mentioned.
This date would obviously precede the recordation of the house con-
struction loan and would, if adopted, avoid the effect of section
1189.1(a), which provides that the commencement of improvements
of the type mentioned in section 1184.1 shall not constitute the com-
mencement of the erection of houses undertaken pursuant to a
separate contract. There is no answer to this particular problem in
the cases.'"
It has been suggested that the statute be amended to provide that
on-site work merely incidental to the off-site improvement undertaken
under separate contract should not in any event constitute commence-
ment of the later on-site building improvement. 7 However, it is
difficult to imagine how the courts would construe "merely incidental"
in the amended section. Suppose the incidental work is paid for by the
16 See generally PROCEEDINGS OF =HE 1961 CAaroRNA LAND Trn. AssoCIATioN
CONVENTION 92.
17 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT or CommrrrEE TO STUDY 1958 CON-
FERENCE RESOLUTION No. 70 (dealing with mechanics' lien laws) at 119-45, Sept. 11,
1962 (unpublished report in University of California Law School Library, Berkeley)
[hereinafter cited as STATE BAn REPORT].
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subdivider or the "extras," though incidental to the off-site project, are
relatively extensive. As the law now stands, a lender could reasonably
believe he is recording 'his encumbrance before the start of the on-site
job he is financing and think the "extras" previously done by the off-
site contractor are off-site work under the separate contract.
Purchase Money Encumbrances
Versus Mechanics' Liens
As to priority against mechanics' liens, should there be a distinction
between purchase money encumbrances and ordinary lenders' trust
deeds or mortgages? This question is occasioned by section 2898 of
the Civil Code, which provides that a purchase money encumbrance
'"has priority over all other liens created against the purchaser, sub-
ject to the operation of the recording laws." On the other hand, Code
of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 provides that mechanics' liens are
preferred to any mortgage or deed of trust that (1) attached after the
commencement of work, or (2) attached before the commencement
of work and was unrecorded and unknown to the lien claimant at the
time of commencement.
If a purchase money mortgage is recorded prior to the commence-
ment of work, ordinarily there is no question of priority. However, a
priority question is raised if the lien claimant proves that the mort-
gagee and mortgagor were joint venturers 8 or that the mortgagee is
estopped from asserting his priority.19 But suppose work commenced,
with no lien claims recorded, at the mortgagor's request even before
he acquired title and recorded the purchase money mortgage. This
situation could arise if a purchaser enters into possession under a con-
tract of sale prior to the execution of a purchase money encumbrance
in favor of the seller. Ogden indicates that here the mechanics' lien
claimant may have priority, but there is no clear answer in the cases.20
If the seller had actual or constructive notice of the start of the
work before the recordation of the purchase money encumbrance,
it would seem that his purchase money mortgage lien might be
superior to the mechanic's lien if a timely notice of non-responsibility
pursuant to section 1183.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is recorded.2'
18 See, e.g., City Lumber Co. v. Brown, 46 Cal. App. 603, 189 Pac. 830 (1920).
19 See, e.g., Eheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Cal. 2d 623, 371 P.2d 578, 21
Cal. Rptr. 802 (1962) (claimant failed to establish estoppel).
20 OrDEN, CALIwOBmA REAL PRoPERTY 620 (1954).
21 Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619, 25 Pac. 919 (1891). In order to avoid responsibility
for mechanics' liens, a non-contracting owner must file a notice within ten days after
he obtains knowledge of the construction.
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In the case of a seller with notice, even the non-responsibility notice
would probably not afford priority to his purchase money encum-
brance recorded after the commencement of work known to him.
More difficult is the question of the seller who has no notice of the
commencement of work and whose purchase money encumbrance is
recorded after such commencement. There is no reasonable basis for
making a distinction between purchase money and ordinary loan
encumbrances-at least as to their relative priority against mechanics'
liens.
Why the Special Priority Rule of Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1189.1(b)?
Section 1189.1(b) provides that the liens arising out of off-site
improvements are preferred to (1) mortgages and deeds of trust
attaching after the commencement of the off-site work, (2) mortgages
and deeds of trust attaching before the commencement of such work
if unrecorded and not known to the claimant, and also (3) mortgages
and deeds of trust given for "the sole or primary purpose" of financing
such off-site improvements which are recorded prior to the commence-
ment of the off-site improvement, unless there is a lender's control
agreement or bond as detailed in the section. In effect, section
1189.1(b) reiterates the general rule of section 1188.1 on the relative
priority of mechanics' liens against mortgages and trust deeds, and
then creates a special rule of priority for mortgages and trust deeds
that secure the financing of off-site improvements.
No good reason can be found for this special rule. Its elimination
would put an end to various problems including the determination of
whether a loan is "for the sole or primary purpose of financing" an
off-site improvement. Had the legislature not included the words
"or primary" in the section, this problem would be less difficult. As it
stands, "how high is up?" can as easily be answered. Some attorneys
have questioned the constitutionality of the section because it can
operate to give a preference to off-site claimants by affording them
priority even over deeds of trust or mortgages recorded before the
commencement of their work. 23 Since loans are often made to finance
off-site as well as on-site work, title insurers cannot be certain that
the lenders insured by them against mechanics' liens have priority
even if their encumbrance was recorded before the commencement of
the on-site work, for the loan might have been made for the primary
purpose of financing the off-site work.
22 But see Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 351 n.144 (1963).
2 3 STATE B REPORT 119-45.
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, The special rule of section 1189.1(b) also seems wrong because
lenders who record their mortgages or deeds of trust to secure loans
for on-site work attain priority over liens for subsequently commenced
work of all kinds without any special lender's agreement or bond2
Why should the lender who finances only the off-site improvement
have any greater burden to protect his position of priority?
The special priority problem of section 1189.1(b) would be
eliminated if any of the current proposals for compulsory labor and
material bonds were adopted. 5 In view of the strong opposition to
compulsory bond proposals, 2 however, the likelihood of their early
adoption appears remote.
Conclusion
This article should serve to illustrate the need for revision of the
present law. The author has found the largest number of problems in
the area of priorities. It is significant, however, that commentators on
other areas of the lien laws often indicate that theirs are the areas of
greatest immediate concern. Small wonder then, that the work of the
committees now studying all phases of the mechanics' lien law is of
such interest and importance to the Bar.
2 4 ODEN, CAioRm.A RxEAL PRoPERTY 616-17 (1954).
25A model draft statute for contractors' liens and materials bonds is appended to
Comment, 51 CALIF. L. Rsv. 351, 369-83 (1963).
26 See A-1 Door Co. v. Fresno Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 A.C. 670, 40 Cal. Rptr.
85 (1964).
